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Abstract
In this paper, we explore how modifying data to preserve privacy affects the
quality of the patterns discoverable in the data. For any analysis of modified
data to be worth doing, the data must be as close to the original as possible.
Therein lies a problem – how does one make sure that modified data still con-
tains the information it had before modification? This question is not the same
as asking if an accurate classifier can be built from the modified data. Often
in the literature, the prediction accuracy of a classifier made from modified
(anonymized) data is used as evidence that the data is similar to the original.
We demonstrate that this is not the case, and we propose a new methodology
for measuring the retention of the patterns that existed in the original data. We
then use our methodology to design three measures that can be easily imple-
mented, each measuring aspects of the data that no pre-existing techniques can
measure. These measures do not negate the usefulness of prediction accuracy or
other measures – they are complementary to them, and support our argument
that one measure is almost never enough.
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1. Introduction
When data contains information about people, preserving the privacy of
those people is often an important concern. For example, government legisla-
tion might require a minimum level of anonymization (i.e. de-identification) of
any data accessible to parties who were not given explicit permission by the
individuals the data describes. Alternatively, individuals may refuse to provide
their data if strong privacy guarantees are not made. Of course, the point of
collecting the data in the first place is usually to discover interesting and useful
patterns, and so the preservation of privacy needs to be done in a way that also
preserves the utility of the data. While discovering patterns can be done manu-
ally using expert domain knowledge, the size and complexity of modern datasets
has led to increasing reliance on data mining techniques. Modern datasets that
contain information about people include medical data, financial data, social
data, and law-enforcement data, among others. They are also often very large,
sometimes containing data about hundreds of thousands of individuals. Data
mining techniques such as decision forests [1, 2], association rule mining [3] and
frequent pattern mining [4] are applied to these datasets in order to extract
patterns, where the patterns are usually in the form X → y. X is a collection
of antecedents (i.e. conditions or requirements) that when true for a record r
(i.e. instance or tuple), predict that a consequent (i.e. label or class value) y is
also true for that record. Usually, each record is a collection of attributes A (i.e.
features) describing an individual person, and the antecedents in X will contain
conditions for specific values v ∈ a of attributes a ∈ A that some records will
meet and others will not.
In order to preserve privacy, the data can be modified in a variety of ways
depending on the how the data is accessible to parties beyond the data owners
(henceforth referred to as “the public”). If the data owners are fully releasing
the data to the public after some modification, noise might be added to each
individual’s values in a way that maintains the overall distribution of values
while hiding the original values of any single individual. Common techniques
2
include additive noise [5, 6, 7] and multiplicative noise [8]. Alternatively, groups
of values could be “generalized” to a single value, making values that were once
different indistinguishable from each other. This is the approach k-anonymity
[9] and its sibling techniques (e.g. l-diversity [10]) use. If the data is remain-
ing under the control of the data owner and the public is merely allowed to
query the data, output perturbation can be used to modify the results of the
individual queries. Differential privacy [11, 12, 13] is the most well-known tech-
nique to use this approach. Differential Privacy can also be used to generate
a synthetic dataset, where new records are created using information from the
original dataset. Henceforth in the paper we will be referring to “modified” ver-
sions of the original data, but synthetic data is an equally valid application of
our proposal. Regardless of the method used to modify the data, the aim is the
same: to protect the privacy of each individual in the data, without destroying
the utility of the data.
Some degradation of dataset D’s utility is unavoidable though, since the
data is no longer the same after anonymization has occurred – the data is
less truthful by definition. This is known as the privacy-utility trade-off, and
optimizing this trade-off is key to a successful privacy-preservation technique. In
order to assess the utility of a dataset modified to preserve privacy, it is currently
common practice [14, 15, 7] to use a variety of data mining techniques (such
as decision forests) to discover patterns in the modified dataset M , and then
see if those patterns can correctly predict the labels of future records. “Future
records” are simulated by excluding some (unmodified) records from the data
mining process. Since the labels of these excluded records are already known,
the user can tell if the patterns discovered in M predicted the labels correctly.
Records used in this way are often known as the “test dataset”, T [16]. The
Prediction Accuracy of the patterns discovered in M can then be compared to
the Prediction Accuracy of the patterns discovered in the original dataset D.
Other measures such as F-measure [17] and AUC [18] can be similarly used.
However this approach of measuring utility has a shortcoming: it cannot tell
the user if the patterns discovered in M are the same patterns discovered in D.
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Table 1: A selection of patterns discovered in the “Adult” dataset [19].
i Antecedent, Xi Consequent, Pr(Y = y)
0
206134 > Census Weighting ≤ 346177 AND
Capital Gains ≤ 4737 AND Age > 40.5 AND
Capital Loss ≤ 1836.5 AND
Hours per Week > 52.5
Pr(Income ≤ $50, 000) = 0.57,
Pr(Income > $50, 000) = 0.43
1
244440.5 < Census Weighting ≤ 249542 AND
Capital Gains ≤ 4737 AND Age ≤ 40.5
Pr(Income ≤ $50, 000) = 0.92,
Pr(Income > $50, 000) = 0.08)
2
Census Weighting ≤ 206134 AND
Capital Gains > 5316.5
Pr(Income ≤ $50, 000) = 0.05,
Pr(Income > $50, 000) = 0.95
3
116388 > Census Weighting ≤ 200855.5 AND
Capital Gains ≤ 5316.5 AND
Capital Loss ≤ 1198 AND
Hours per Week ≤ 53.5
Pr(Income ≤ $50, 000) = 0.81,
Pr(Income > $50, 000) = 0.19
There is no way of knowing if the modifications made to D caused the original
patterns to change (or disappear), or if weaker patterns became strong enough
to become more prominent. We propose a solution to this shortcoming of the
traditional approach: a methodology for measuring the retention of the original
patterns in M . We implement our proposed methodology with three straight-
forward measures of pattern retention, but they are by no means exhaustive.
What makes a pattern useful to a user can vary wildly depending on their needs,
and it would be misguided to blindly apply a “one size fits all” measure to all
privacy preservation scenarios, devoid of context.
1.1. Problem Statement
In this paper, we frame the problem from the perspective of the data owner,
where the data owner is wishing to release their data to the public in a way
that protects the privacy of each individual in the data. They do not wish to
secure and maintain a server that outputs perturbed results to queries asked
by the public, nor do they want to define groupings of values for each of the
attributes present in the data. In this paper we will focus on the scenario in
which noise is added to the values of the individuals. We use both continuous
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(i.e. numerical) and discrete (i.e. categorical) data. Note that the specific
method of anonymization is not the focus, rather the focus is on how to measure
the utility of the data once the anonymization method has been used.
The problem the data owner is facing is how to know how much degradation
is occurring in when privacy-preservation techniques are applied to their data.
They can use data mining techniques to find patterns in the modified data M
and see if those patterns are accurate, but there is no way to tell if the patterns
are the same as the patterns that could be found in the original data D.
Which patterns the data owner deems important enough to monitor is out-
side the scope of this paper. What makes a pattern valuable can vary depending
on the needs of the user, and measures have been developed to assess different
aspects of patterns, such as a pattern’s support or coverage [20, 21], confidence
[22], conciseness [23], peculiarity [24], or many other aspects depending on the
user’s needs [25, 26, 27, 28]. These measures are often collectively referred to
as interestingness measures. How the patterns are discovered is also outside of
the scope of this paper – any patterns in the form X → y are applicable to
the solution proposed in this paper. In our experiments, we arbitrarily use the
CART decision tree algorithm [29] to generate a collection of patterns. The
number of patterns that are monitored can be as high as the data owners likes.
We define a dataset D as a two-dimensional table made up of independent
rows, each defined by the values it possesses in each column. Each row represents
a record r ∈ D, and each column represents an attribute a ∈ A. Each a is made
up of its own set of values, with each r possessing one value av per a, written
as ra = av; ∀a ∈ A. When D is modified to preserve privacy, we denote the
modified dataset as M . A dataset made up of records excluded from D for
testing purposes is symbolized as T .
A “pattern” can be defined as a rule X → y ∈ Y , where X is an antecedent,
representing a set of conditions in the form a = av that when met, predicts that
a consequent Y will equal y [16]. Y is an attribute that has been chosen as
the consequent (i.e. class attribute or label) of the pattern. If a record r meets
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every condition in X (i.e. r ∈ σX(D))
1, it is predicted to have a label Y = y
either with certainty or with some probability (i.e. 0 ≤ P (rY = y) ≤ 1). Both
a and Y can be either continuous or discrete; if continuous, other operators can
be used such as a > av and Y < y. Note that we abuse notation and simplify
X → y to just X when it is clear from context that we mean the whole pattern.
We refer to the set of all patterns {Xi; ∀i} discovered in a dataset D as
ZD. If ZD is used to predict Y for all records in T , we write the average
accuracy of these predictions (that is, the “Prediction Accuracy”) as α(ZD|T ).
In words, this can be read as “The accuracy of ZD at correctly predicting class
values of records in T ”. Some examples of patterns can be seen in Table 1,
including the probability of r having a label y. Our proposed methodology and
its implementations are independent of methods for discovering patterns – any
patterns in the form X → y are applicable, regardless of whether they were
manually found, found with a decision tree or via association rule mining or
frequent pattern mining, or any other method.
1.2. Our Contribution
Our contribution can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel methodology for measuring the pattern retention of a
dataset after it has been modified (or had synthetic data generated from
it) with a privacy-preservation technique.
• We implement and test three measures that use our methodology and
demonstrate their sensitivity to changes in pattern retention.
• Using a thought experiment, we demonstrate that other pre-existing mea-
sures are not sensitive to changes in pattern retention, while our measures
are.
1Read σ as the mathematical symbol for selection. For example, σp(q) is the subset of
elements in q for which p is true. p can either be a statement such as Y = y, or a set of
statements such as X, in which case all statements in set p must be true for an element in q
in order for that element to be in the set σp(q).
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• We also provide a correlation matrix of our three measures and three pre-
existing measures, showing that there is almost no correlation between the
performance of a classifier built from the modified data, and the retention
of the original patterns. This demonstrates that no single measure can be
expected to inform the user (e.g. the data owner) about every change in
the data after anonymization, and that our methodology captures infor-
mation that no pre-existing measure does.
We also make the code for our three implementations of our proposed method-
ology available online.2
In Sect. 2 we propose a generalized methodology for measuring the retention
of patterns in modified data. In Sect. 3 we present three implementations of the
proposed methodology. In Sect. 4 we discuss three pre-existing utility measures.
In Sect. 5 we use a thought experiment to explore our measures alongside pre-
existing measures. In Sect. 6 we detail our experiments, and in Sect. 7 we
present our empirical findings. We summarize our thoughts and conclude the
paper in Sect. 8.
2. A Methodology for Measuring Pattern Retention
While Prediction Accuracy is an excellent measure when evaluating the util-
ity of a classifier or model [30, 31], care needs to be taken when extending its
use to the privacy-preservation domain. It has been common in the past for
privacy-preservation techniques to have their effect on the quality (utility) of
the data measured with prediction accuracy [14, 32, 15, 7]. This necessitates
applying a data mining technique to the anonymized data M to build a clas-
sifier, or discovering a collection of patterns with another technique, and then
testing the ability for that collection of patterns3 ZM to accurately predict the
2The code can be found at http://csusap.csu.edu.au/∼zislam/ or you can email us.
3Note that a classifier is semantically the same thing as a collection of patterns if it can
be broken down into antecedents and consequents.
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class value of records in a testing dataset T . The accuracy of ZM can then be
compared to the accuracy of ZD (i.e. α(ZD|T )− α(ZM |T )), and the difference
is considered to be how much the privacy-preservation technique has affected
the data. See Fig. 1 for a graphical representation of the data and classifiers
used in this discussion.
We see two problems with this current methodology:
(1) It only tells the user if the particular technique used to find the patterns
in M produced a good classifier / model / list of patterns. Perhaps some
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b1
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y0
y1
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b1
b0
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b b
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Figure 1: A diagram of the data and classifiers involved when modifying data and testing for
changes in quality. T is drawn from the same distribution that D was drawn from, without
replacement. M is a modified version of the data found in D. ZD is any kind of classifier
built using D, and similarly for ZM and M . ZD|M notates an assessment of ZD when M is
inputted into it (and similarly for other classifiers and inputs).
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amount of implicit assumptions can be made about the ability of other
techniques to perform similarly well (“technique f did well, so techniques g
and h probably produce similar results”), but there is by no means anything
explicitly said by one ZM about the universal quality of all data mining
techniques applied to M .
(2) The user cannot tell if the patterns in ZM are the same patterns that can be
discovered in D (such as the patterns that would be discovered if the same
data mining technique was applied to D, producing ZD). Some patterns
might still be there, while others might not, and the patterns that are still
there might have changed in any number of ways (such as changes in the
support or confidence of the pattern, or the values av used in the conditions
in X).
A solution to (1) is for the data owner to build a ZM and ZD with every
possible data mining technique they think is worth checking [14]. This solution is
extremely computationally expensive, and does not address (2). If this solution
is not used, then a user must either trust the implicit assumption that other data
mining techniques will perform similarly, or release the collection of patterns ZM
that they did test, and not release M to the public at all [14]. To the best of
our knowledge, aside from our preliminary investigation [32], no solution to (2)
currently exists in the literature.4
We therefore propose a methodology that addresses both problems. Rather
than discovering a collection of patterns in M (i.e. ZM ) that may or may not
have any relation to the patterns in D (i.e. ZD), we propose that the data
owner defines a collection of patterns found in D and evaluates if the data in M
still follows those patterns. No ZM needs to be computed in order to measure
the pattern retention of M . Nor is T required, unless it is desired for other,
unrelated testing.
This methodology removes the problem described in (1), since there is no
4This paper is an extension of that investigation, not previously published in a journal.
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longer any data mining technique being applied to M . It also solves (2) since
the same patterns that were found in D are being used to evaluate M .
The next natural question is: how exactly do we evaluate M with ZD?
There are many potential implementations of our proposed methodology, but
we provide three examples below in Sect. 3. The first measure (in Sect. 3.1)
evaluates how much of ZD as a whole has been retained in M . The next two
measures (in Sect. 3.2 and Sect. 3.3) evaluate the presence of each pattern in ZD
(i.e. Xi; ∀i) separately, offering the data owner the ability to check for changes in
individual patterns, as well as seeing the average change. Other implementations
can easily be designed to meet the needs of the data owner. Every dataset has its
own nuances, and it is usually advantageous to take those nuances into account
when measuring the effect of privacy-preservation techniques, rather than trying
to use a “catch-all” approach. The release of data to the public will be a one-
time event (once it’s out there, there’s no taking it back!), and so spending
additional resources to properly evaluate D and M is likely worth it.
3. Implementations of the Methodology
3.1. Pattern Accuracy
Introduced by us in a 2014 conference [32] and not published in a journal until
now, Pattern Accuracy is a simple measure that compares D and M . Like its
name might suggest, it is very similar to Prediction Accuracy in that it measures
the average accuracy of a collection of patterns at predicting the class value Y
of some data. However instead of predicting the class value of some testing
data T , it predicts the class values of the modified data M . If the Prediction
Accuracy of M is written as α(ZM |T ), then the Pattern Accuracy of M is
written as α(ZD|M). In a privacy-preservation scenario the point is to compare
M ’s performance to D, so Prediction Accuracy becomes α(ZD|T )− α(ZM |T ),
and the Pattern Accuracy equivalent is therefore α(ZD|D) − α(ZD|M).
5 Note
5Remember that M is a modified version of D, with each record in M corresponding to an
unaltered version in D
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that while α(ZD|D) should not be used to assess the quality of a classifier due to
the risk of of overfitting, in this paper we are not concerned with the generality
of the patterns. How ZD is created or defined is outside the scope of this paper.
Instead, the difference between α(ZD|D) and α(ZD|M) tells us the difference
in the number of records that are contributing to the prediction made by each
pattern (where the prediction is the majority class label). Pattern Accuracy is
a way of measuring the presence of D’s patterns in M ; if α(ZD|D)− α(ZD|M)
is close to zero, then the user knows that a similar number of records in D and
M are contributing to the correct predictions made by the classifier built from
D. Since the records in M are just modified versions of the records in D, this
is a valuable thing to know! If α(ZD|D) − α(ZD|M) is closer to one, the user
knows that the records were modified in a way that reduced the presence of the
patterns found in ZD. If α(ZD|D) − α(ZD|M) is negative, this is actually just
as bad as positive result of similar magnitude, because D is trusted data – any
random modifications made to D is further from the trusted data by definition,
even if some quality metrics increase. Ideally we want every pattern in ZD to
be just as prevalent in M as it is in D; no more, no less. Thus we define Pattern
Accuracy as:
Pattern Accuracy = |α(ZD|D)− α(ZD|M)| . (1)
Pattern Accuracy evaluates whether ZD, as a whole, can correctly predict Y
for records inM . Since it uses an identical process to Prediction Accuracy (with
the user simply having to redirect the measure to check M rather than T ), it
gains all of the benefits of Prediction Accuracy such as low computation time and
conceptual simplicity. What it does not do, however, is evaluate the presence
of each pattern individually (i.e. Xi; ∀i). There are almost always multiple
patterns that predict the same y ∈ Y , so it is possible that some patterns no
longer have records in M that follow them (and instead those records follow
different patterns) without the Pattern Accuracy result changing. As long as
the record’s new pattern still correctly predicts y, the Pattern Accuracy measure
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is insensitive to this change. The following two measures avoid this insensitivity
by evaluating the pattern retention in M on a per-pattern basis, rather than
evaluating the entire pattern list as a whole.
3.2. Pattern Support Distance (PSD)
The “support” of a pattern is the number of records in a dataset that a
pattern covers [21, 22], and can be represented as |σX(D)| when describing the
support of patternX in datasetD. Whether Y is predicted correctly is irrelevant
when measuring support. To measure the support for X in D compared to M ,
we can calculate |σX(D)| and |σX(M)|. By comparing these results, a user
knows how much the presence of an individual pattern X has changed due to
the modifications made to D (resulting in M). This level of granularity allows
the user to use their domain knowledge to make specific assessments of the status
of each X . This can naturally be repeated for all X ∈ ZD. To summarize the
overall support retention of ZD for a dataset M , the mean difference can be
calculated:
PSD =
1
|ZD| × |D|
∑
X∈ZD
| |σX(D)| − |σX(M)| | . (2)
Note that each pattern contributes equally to the mean difference. Patterns
with higher support are not assumed to be more important, since each X in ZD
should have already been assessed by the user as being important enough to
worry about preserving in M , and we are now only interested in if the original
support has changed. It should be noted though that patterns in ZD with very
low support cannot reduce in size by as much as patterns with high support
– support cannot go below 0 – so the presence of many patterns with low
support risks “diluting” PSD.6 However it is normal for such small patterns to
be considered as idiosyncrasies ofD, and not generalizing to future records (such
6This effect is caused whenever many small differences are averaged alongside several large
differences. The presence of near-zero numbers effectively reduces the average, diluting the
larger differences. There is nothing inherently wrong with this, but it is usually undesirable.
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as T ), and so most data mining algorithms automatically remove them from ZD
[16]. This is sometimes referred to as the “minimum support threshold”.
PSD (Pattern Support Distance) has a defined lower and upper limit of
0 ≤ PSD ≤ 1, allowing for an intuitive interpretation of the result, such as:
“The average percentage change in the prevalence of a pattern when modifying
D into M”.
The aim of privacy preservation is to (1) make any individual record difficult
to identify, while (2) leaving the patterns as unaffected as possible [5, 33, 7].
The pattern support difference (PSD) of M accurately measures the second
half of this aim, allowing researchers to make more informed assessments of the
overall success of a privacy preservation technique. The specific records that
matched each X in D is irrelevant – X will still be just as prevalent in M as it
was in D if other records take the place of the records that no longer follow X .
In order for a record to change which pattern it matches, its values must have
changed during the modification process enough for it to legitimately meet the
conditions of a different pattern.
While Pattern Accuracy somewhat measures the presence (support) of Xi ∈
ZD; ∀i in M , PSD does so with precision, removing any uncertainty about the
presence of each pattern in M .
3.3. Pattern Label Distance (PLD)
Say a record r ∈ D meets the conditions of a certain pattern Xi ∈ ZD (i.e.
r ∈ σXi(D)). When D is modified to M , it is possible that r will be changed
in a way that causes it to meet the conditions of a different pattern Xj ∈ ZD
(i.e. r ∈ σXj (M)). If this occurs, the distribution of labels (i.e. Y ) will change
for both Xi and Xj , since rY has been removed from Xi’s distribution of class
labels and added to Xj’s. The purpose of a pattern is often to predict Y , and
so it is important to know how much that prediction might have changed in
M . Pattern Accuracy measures this to an extent, as Xi and Xj might predict
different class labels and a maximum of one of those predictions can be correct
for a record r. But it is also possible that the two patterns will predict the
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same class label, leading to no change in the Pattern Accuracy of M compared
to D (at least as far as r is concerned). The consequent of any pattern X is
usually the most common class label to occur out of all the records in σX(D),
with any other class labels being ignored [16]. This has the effect of making X ’s
prediction of Y = y appear identically confident7 regardless of how high or low
the frequency of y is in σX(M) compared to σX(D), as long as it remains the
most frequent class label.
To avoid these problems, we use the Chi-squared histogram distance [34] to
measure differences in the distribution of Y between σX(D) and σX(M):
χ2(σX(D), σX(M)) =
1
2
∑
y∈Y
(fDy − f
M
y )
2
fDy + f
M
y
, (3)
where fDy is the relative frequency of the class label y in σX(D) (in other words,
the fraction of records in σX(D) that have rY = y), and similarly for f
M
y in
respect to σX(M).
Just like with Chi-squared hypothesis testing, Chi-squared histogram dis-
tance becomes unstable if there are less than five samples. This limitation
is automatically handled if a minimum support threshold for each pattern X
was applied when making ZD; otherwise we recommend discounting any pat-
terns that have less than five class labels (i.e. ignore patterns X ∈ ZD where
|σX(D)| < 5).
Even if the majority y value in σX(D) occurs even more frequently in σX(M)
(and thus has increased confidence), this should not be considered as an im-
provement unless the modification that created M was aiming to improve pat-
tern utility. In scenarios such as privacy preservation, the distribution of Y for
σX(D) is considered to be the ground truth. PLD (Pattern Label Distance)
successfully captures this scenario, where any distance away from D is a reduc-
7“Confidence” refers to the certainty or reliability of a pattern – that is, how frequent the
most frequent label is [20]. If 100% of the records in a pattern have the same class label, then
that pattern can be considered highly reliable.
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tion in utility by definition. The mean Chi-squared histogram distance of all
patterns in ZD can then be easily calculated:
PLD =
1
|ZD|
∑
X∈ZD
χ2(σX(D), σX(M)) . (4)
It should be noted that Chi-squared histogram distance is invariant to the
number of records [34], and so the support of a pattern (both in D andM) does
not affect the result. If the support of each pattern is deemed relevant by the
user, |σX(D)| can easily be taken into account as well. We do not recommend
combining a pattern’s support difference and label distribution distance into a
single result, as the results are likely to be far more informative when separate.
This is true for both single patterns and the mean results (PSD and PLD).
Chi-squared histogram distance is also invariant to the number of labels, so it is
not restricted to datasets or patterns with a particularly sized Y . This is often
a concern with popular measures such as AUC [18] and F-measure [17], where
non-binary class attributes need to be treated with care [35].
4. Related Utility Measures
As mentioned in Sect. 1, it is common in the literature for a privacy-
preserving technique’s impact on data utility to be quantified using Prediction
Accuracy: that is, by comparing α(ZM |T ) to α(ZD|T ) [16]. Other common
measures are F-measure [17] and AUC [18], where again ZM is compared to ZD
using T (refer to Fig. 1 for a graphical representation of these data and classi-
fiers). We use Prediction Accuracy, F-measure and AUC in our experiments.
Formally, Prediction Accuracy can be written as:
α(ZD|T ) =
1
|T |
∑
r∈T
1(rY = ypredicted) , (5)
where ypredicted is the class value y ∈ Y that ZD predicts r to have, and rY is r’s
actual class value. The indicator function, 1(x), returns 1 if x is true; otherwise
0. Thus, Prediction Accuracy is the fraction of records that have their class
label correctly predicted.
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AUC and F-measure are most appropriate when Y is binary (i.e. |Y | = 2),
and where y1 ∈ Y is the “important” class label, or the class label that the
user is trying to correctly predict, and y2 ∈ Y is unimportant. These labels
are often referred to as the “positive” and “negative” labels, respectively. A
“True Positive” (TP) label is therefore a label that was correctly predicted to
be positive, a “False Positive” (FP) is a label that was predicted to be positive
but was not, and similarly for “True Negative” (TN) and “False Negative”
(FN).8
F-measure [17] can be formally written in terms of precision ( TP
TP+FP ) and
recall ( TP
TP+FN ) as:
Fβ = (1 + β
2)×
precision × recall
β2 × precision+ recall
, (6)
where β is very often equal to 1, so that recall and precision have equal weighting.
We use β = 1 in our experiments.
Meanwhile, AUC [18] is shorthand for “Area under the ROC curve”, with
“ROC” in turn being short for “Receiver Operating Characteristic”. The ROC
curve describes the trade-off between TP (benefits) and FP (costs). Often it
is plotted on axes with the TP Rate ( TP
TP+FN ) as the y axis and the FP Rate
( FP
FP+TN ) as the x axis. Thus, AUC is the area under this curve. It represents
the probability that ZD is more likely to predict a positive label as positive than
to predict a negative label as positive. It has become popular in the machine
learning community as of late, despite some problems it has when comparing
different classifiers [36, 37].
5. A Thought Experiment
We use a thought experiment to demonstrate the sensitivity of our measures
to changes in the data that are not detected by pre-existing measures. We
will use the toy data and classifiers seen in Fig. 1. The patterns in ZD have
8Using this notation, we can actually re-write Prediction Accuracy as TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
.
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Table 2: The root-to-leaf paths from ZD in Fig. 1 expressed as patterns, including confidence
and support.
i Antecedent, Xi Consequent, Pr(Y = y) Support
0 a0 Pr(y0) = 0.66, Pr(y1) = 0.34 3
1 a1 Pr(y0) = 0.0, Pr(y1) = 1.0 1
2 a2 AND b0 Pr(y0) = 1.0, Pr(y1) = 0.0 1
3 a2 AND b1 Pr(y0) = 1.0, Pr(y1) = 0.0 1
Table 3: The root-to-leaf paths from ZM in Fig. 1 expressed as patterns, including confidence
and support.
i Antecedent, Xi Consequent, Pr(Y = y) Support
0 a0 AND b0 Pr(y0) = 1.0, Pr(y1) = 0.0 1
1 a0 AND b1 Pr(y0) = 1.0, Pr(y1) = 0.0 1
2 a1 Pr(y0) = 1.0, Pr(y1) = 0.0 1
3 a2 Pr(y0) = 0.34, Pr(y1) = 0.66 3
been written out in Table 2, along with their support and confidence. After
modifying D with a privacy-preservation technique, the result is M as seen in
Fig. 1. The classifier ZM was then made from that modified data; we present
the patterns in Table 3. We then assess the quality of M using six measures:
our three implementations of our proposed methodology, as well as Prediction
Accuracy, AUC and F-measure. The results are tabulated in Table 4.
Several things have happened here. Firstly, Prediction Accuracy was com-
pletely incapable of detecting any changes in M compared to D. It is possible
that the user does not actually care thatM is different, and is only interested in
being able to make good predictions on future data (and that is fine). However,
if the user makes any assumption about the similarity between M and D with
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Table 4: The results of six measures when the two patterns seen in Table 2 undergo changes
so that they now resemble what is seen in Table 3.
Pattern
Accuracy
PSD PLD
Prediction
Accuracy
AUC F-measure
D 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.80
M 0.50 0.08 0.34 0.67 0.50 0.67
Change 0.50 0.08 0.34 0.00 0.17 0.13
Prediction Accuracy, they have made a very dangerous mistake. As we can
see visually in Fig. 1, ZM is radically different from ZD. Due to the changes
present in M , the patterns discovered in M are very different from the patterns
discovered in D. Our proposed methodology solves the issue of quantifying the
visual intuition one has about the differences between ZM and ZD. Pattern
Accuracy, PSD and PLD were all able to accurately identify the differences be-
tween D and M that they are designed to identify: the overall retention of ZD’s
patterns, the changes in the patterns’ support and the changes in the patterns’
class label distribution, respectively.
AUC and F-measure were able to detect some changes, but it is important
to recognize that these changes do not represent any connection between ZD
and ZM . Both measures started by calculating the true and false predictions
of the positive and negative labels of ZD using T , and then they made similar
calculations of ZM using T . At no point was ZM actually compared to ZD,
except indirectly, in much the same way that Prediction Accuracy indirectly
compares them. As demonstrated by Prediction Accuracy’s results in Table 4
though, there is no guarantee that any of these indirect comparisons will detect
any differences at all. Even if they do, how does the user use that information,
except to prompt them to look at the patterns discovered with their human
intuition? Pattern Accuracy, PSD and PLD offer concrete results about M ’s
retention of D’s patterns.
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6. Experiment Methodology
To empirically evaluate our three measures, we carry out the below exper-
iments and present the results in Sect. 7. For our experiments, the patterns
are generated using decision trees. Note that the patterns could just have eas-
ily been manually created, generated from a different classifier, filtered using
any number of interestingness measures, hand-picked from a list of generated
patterns, or by any other means that outputs patterns in the form X → y.
We use 17 datasets publicly available in the UCI Machine Learning Repos-
itory [19]. To generate a collection of patterns for each dataset (i.e. ZD), we
run the CART algorithm [29], with a minimum leaf size (i.e. minimum support
threshold) of |D| × 0.02 and a maximum tree depth of 12. By generating pat-
terns in this way, we produce a set of realistic patterns for each dataset, with
patterns also varying in length (i.e. the number of conditions in X). Another
advantage of generating our patterns in this way is that the deterministic nature
of CART allows for others to replicate our ZD’s exactly.
Our datasets range in size from 653 to 58000 records, 6 to 62 attributes, and
2 to 18 class labels, and include both numerical and categorical attributes. The
number of patterns (i.e. |ZD|) ranges from 11 to 37. The details of the datasets
are summarized in Table 5.
For experiments involving AUC and F-measure (e.g. Table 6, discussed later)
we limit our experiments to datasets with binary labels, where these measures
are known to work best.
6.1. Privacy-Preservation Techniques
To simulate various modifications to a dataset, we add noise to the data
in two simple ways. Each type of noise represents a different scenario respec-
tively: where attribute and multi-attribute (i.e. multivariate) distributions are
flattened (i.e. made more uniform); and where attribute distributions and most
multi-attribute distributions are preserved. We simulate these scenarios using
additive noise. Using these two scenarios, we explore what a user can learn from
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Table 5: Details of the datasets used in our experiments. The columns are, in order: the
number of records in D; the number of continuous attributes in D; the number discrete
attributes in D; the number of labels (class values) for Y in D; and the relative frequency of
the most common label in Y .
Name Records
Numerical
Attributes
Categorical
Attributes
Labels
Majority
Label %
Banknotes 1372 4 0 2 55%
Vehicle 846 18 0 4 26%
RedWine 1599 11 0 6 43%
Spambase 4601 57 0 2 60%
Wilt 4839 5 0 2 95%
WallSensor 5456 4 0 4 40%
PageBlocks 5473 10 0 5 90%
OptDigits 5620 62 0 10 10%
PenWritten 10992 16 0 10 10%
GammaTele 19014 10 0 2 65%
Shuttle 58000 9 0 7 79%
Credit 653 6 9 2 55%
Parkinsons 1040 28 1 2 50%
Yeast 1484 7 1 10 31%
Cardio 2126 21 1 3 78%
Adult 30162 6 5 2 75%
Bank 45211 7 9 2 88%
our three implementations of our proposed methodology, and how they compare
to Prediction Accuracy, AUC and F-measure.
The two types noise addition we use are listed below. Note that these are
simple toy noise addition techniques, and are not part of this paper’s contribu-
tion.
Uniform Noise (UN). A user-defined percentage of values in the dataset D are
changed, with the result being M . If a value ra is changed and a is a continuous
attribute, the new value is selected from a uniform distribution between the
minimum and maximum values of a. If a is a discrete (i.e. categorical) attribute,
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ra is changed to any unique value in the set a, with each value having an equal
probability of being selected. Values are randomly selected, with the original
value having no effect on the new value. This has the effect of flattening the
distribution of values for all attributes, as well as flattening all multivariate
distributions.
Gaussian Noise (GN). A user-defined percentage of values in the dataset D
are changed, with the result being M . If a value ra is changed and a is a
continuous attribute, a random number is selected from a Gaussian distribution
with a mean of zero and a variance equal to a’s variance, and added to ra.
If a is a discrete (i.e. categorical) attribute, ra is changed to a value that is
randomly selected from a’s original set of values (including repeated values). GN
therefore maintains the distribution of values for both numerical and categorical
attributes. Additionally, continuous values are changed in a way that takes into
account the original value. This means that each record’s continuous values
are likely to remain close to their original values, and thus the multivariate
distribution of the dataset is likely to be preserved.
Neither of these noise types add noise to the label Y . For each type of noise,
we increase the percentage chance of changing a value in 2% increments, from
0% to 30%. For each increment, for each type of noise, for each dataset, we use
10-fold cross-validation iteratively 10 times (for a total of 100 tests), creating
a new set of patterns ZD each time. For each test, we collect the result of six
measures: Pattern Accuracy, PSD, PLD, Prediction Accuracy and AUC and
F-measure.
6.2. Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient
By comparing the results of each measure as noise increases, for each dataset,
we calculate the measures’ correlation to each other using Pearson’s correlation
coefficient (i.e. Pearson’s r value) [38]. We calculate their correlation for each
noise type separately. The coefficient has a range of −1 ≤ r ≤ 1, where a result
close to 1 indicates a high positive correlation (as one measure increases, so does
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the other measure), a result close to -1 indicates a high negative correlation (as
one measure increases, the other decreases), and a result close to 0 indicates
low correlation (the result of one measure has little bearing on the result of the
other). To standardize the results of different datasets, we look at the difference
between each measure’s result on M compared to D. In other words, for each
level of noise, we subtract the result that the measure achieved when there was
zero noise. This has no effect on our proposed measures (which always equal
0 when there is no noise), and simply causes Prediction Accuracy, AUC and
F-measure to be reported as the difference between the “true” result and the
“noisy” result.
7. Results
To demonstrate the information a user can learn about individual pattern
retention, Fig. 2 presents the support and Chi-squared histogram distance of
the example patterns shown in Table 1, as UN increases. In this example, we
can see that the four patterns are affected quite differently by the noise addition.
Some of the observations a data scientist could make about these four patterns
are:
• X3 has gone from representing over 8000 of the of 30162 records in Adult
to representing only 3000 records in the modified version of Adult by the
time UN has reached 30%.
• Despite this massive change in support, the distribution of the class labels
in X3 is actually almost exactly the same at all noise levels.
• The same cannot be said for X2, where a massive change in support (from
less than 1000 to roughly 4000) has been accompanied by a massive change
in the distribution of class labels as well.
– If this observation caused the user to investigate further, they would
find that X2’s change in label distribution was enough to completely
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Figure 2: The support and Chi-squared Histogram Distance of the example patterns shown
in Table 1 (discovered in the Adult dataset), as UN increases.
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flip the prediction the pattern is making! At 30% noise, the reported
probability of a record having each label is Pr(Income ≤ $50, 000) =
0.68, Pr(Income > $50, 000) = 0.32, compared to the probabilities
shown in Table 1: Pr(Income ≤ $50, 000) = 0.05, Pr(Income >
$50, 000) = 0.95. It would be incredibly damaging to any analysis
performed with M if the data analyst trusted this pattern.
• X0 and X1 represent a much smaller proportion of the Adult dataset,
and have undergone moderate changes in support. X0 has grown larger,
while X1 has become smaller, but neither saw enough change in label
distribution to cause concern.
• These patterns in Adult were discovered with a decision tree, along with
31 other patterns that underwent a variety of changes in support and label
distribution similar to the changes shown in Fig. 2.
After averaging the support distance and Chi-squared histogram distance
of all patterns and thus calculating PSD and PLD, we can compare their as-
sessments of M ’s pattern retention for each dataset. We also compare PSD
and PLD to the assessment made by Pattern Accuracy. For each dataset, we
present the results of PSD, PLD and Pattern Accuracy as UN increases in Fig.
3. Note that for Pattern Accuracy, we present the percentage of cases where ZD
incorrectly predicts the label of records in M so that lower values signify better
pattern retention for all three measures.9 As more noise is added, we observe
that all three measures trend up as expected, but upon closer inspection we can
see that they do not do so at identical rates.
7.1. Correlations between utility measures
The differences in trends seen in Fig. 3 are quantified by the correlations
between the measures, seen in Table 6. The correlations are calculated using
Pearson’s correlation coefficient [38] as described in Sect. 6.2, and Prediction
9That is, pattern accuracy error = 1− pattern accuracy.
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Figure 3: The mean results of PSD, PLD and Pattern Accuracy Error as UN increases. The
left-hand y axis corresponds to PLD and PSD. The right-hand y axis corresponds to Pattern
Accuracy Error. The x axis is the percentage of noise from 0% to 30%.
25
Table 6: A matrix of correlations for each combination of two measures, for all two noise
types. We include the p value of each correlation in brackets (i.e. the probability of observing
a result at least as extreme as the one reported by chance, assuming there is zero correlation).
Measure PLD PSD
Prediction
Accuracy
AUC F-measure
UN
Pattern
Accuracy
-0.77 (0.00) -0.83 (0.00) 0.36 (0.00) 0.34 (0.00) 0.26 (0.00)
PLD 0.58 (0.00) -0.32 (0.00) -0.23 (0.01) -0.09 (0.33)
PSD -0.21 (0.02) -0.35 (0.00) -0.28 (0.00)
Prediction
Accuracy
0.77 (0.00) 0.47 (0.00)
AUC 0.91 (0.00)
GN
Pattern
Accuracy
-0.86 (0.00) -0.77 (0.00) 0.19 (0.04) 0.20 (0.02) 0.21 (0.02)
PLD 0.44 (0.00) -0.04 (0.67) -0.08 (0.35) -0.09 (0.34)
PSD -0.13 (0.14) -0.27 (0.00) -0.26 (0.00)
Prediction
Accuracy
0.72 (0.00) 0.50 (0.00)
AUC 0.93 (0.00)
Accuracy, AUC and F-measure are included as well. Unlike Fig. 3, the correla-
tions are calculated using the nine datasets with binary labels for the benefit of
AUC and F-measure.10
One observation we can make about Table 6 is that despite all the measures
using the same data, they do not always agree with each other. Just because
Prediction Accuracy decreases does not mean that F-measure also decreases, for
example. Another observation is that Prediction Accuracy, F-measure and AUC
have very weak correlations with any of our implementations of our proposed
10The correlations among PLD, PSD, Pattern Accuracy and Prediction Accuracy when
using the datasets shown in Fig. 3 are similar to those shown in Table 6.
26
methodology. This is interesting, and confirms our suspicions that just because
a good classifier (that is, a classifier that achieves good results) can be made
from noisy data, does not mean that the patterns in the noisy data have the
same properties as the original patterns, or even that the original patterns are
in the noisy data at all. For example if a user observed a particular amount of
Prediction Accuracy loss after modifying D to M , there is no way to tell how
much the support of the patterns in D might have changed.
8. Discussion
None of our proposed measures can tell a user if a good classifier can be
made from M . They are not trying to! If a user wishes to learn that, they
can use machine learning algorithms on M and see if the resulting classifier
has good performance, using measures such as Prediction Accuracy. Doing so,
however, will not tell them if those machine learning algorithms found the same
patterns that existed in D. That is where our proposed methodology – and our
implementations of that methodology – come in.
Pattern Accuracy, PSD and PLD should not be interpreted as exhaustively
measuring all aspects of pattern retention. Rather, they are examples of quanti-
fying specific effects a privacy-preservation technique can have on data. It is the
responsibility of the data scientist performing the anonymization of D to assess
what properties of a dataset are relevant or important, and then to measure
how those properties might have changed after data modification or synthesiza-
tion. Pattern Accuracy measures the overall retention of the original patterns;
PSD measures changes in pattern support, per pattern; PLD measures changes
in label distribution per pattern; other measures might focus on quantifying
changes in pattern conciseness or peculiarity or any number of other properties
that might make patterns interesting to a user.
Prediction Accuracy is currently heavily relied upon in privacy-preservation
research. While the measure itself is very useful, it should not be viewed as
an all-encompassing measure of the quality of modified or synthetic data, but
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rather as another example of quantifying a specific property – the ability for
accurate classifiers to be built using a variety of machine-learning algorithms.
Measuring properties of ZD in M is straightforward, both conceptually and
computationally, and can be easily used in conjunction with Prediction Accuracy
and other measures. It enables the user to quantify aspects ofM that previously
could only be assessed with experience or intuition.
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